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The Space WARC: International
Accommodations for Satellite
Communications
Martin A. Rothblatt*

INTRODUCTION
Communication satellites in geostationary orbit have the marvelous ability
to permit information exchange across very large distances. These satellites
can accomplish this feat because they are high enough above the earth's
surface to be in the "line-of-sight" of microwave transmitters and receivers many thousands of miles apart. 1 Although communication satellites
were first used to relay information between continents, by the end of the
1970s they were being used increasingly to transmit information within
large countries. This more recent usage, known as "domestic satellite service," is an attractive substitute for lengthy terrestrial microwave or cable
networks. 2
The growth of domestic satellite ("domsat") service has begun to cause
scarcity problems in the geostationary orbit at the microwave frequency
bands employed for sending information to and from communications
satellites. 3 These problems arise because communications satellite transmissions directed at the same portion of the earth's surface will interfere
with each other, and thereby lose their information content, unless the
satellites are spaced some distance apart. The requisite satellite spacing is
the function of many technical factors, but, with existing technology, is
generally about three degrees. 4 The total geostationary orbit in which
satellites are placed encircles the earth's equator at an altitude of six earth
radii.
Certain portions of the geostationary orbit are, however, more in deMartin A. Rothblatt received his A.B. in 1977, and his J.D. and M.B.A. in 1981 from
the University of California at Los Angeles. He is the Chairman, Legal Implications Subcommittee of the FCC 1985 ITU Space Warc Advisory Committee; Member, International Institute of Space Law (elected, 1980); Member of the District of Columbia Bar, and practices
space communications law at the law offices of Martin A. Rothblatt in Washington, D.C.
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mand than others, a factor which aggravates scarcity problems. sFor example, it is necessary to associate orbital positions with the longitudes of the
portion of the world receiving domsat service. Failure to do so would result
either in the earth itself blocking the line-of-sight to the satellite or in the
satellite signal arriving at too low an angle of elevation for relayed signals
to be adequately received. Hence, geostationary orbit scarcity problems
may become especially severe at European and African longitudes, where
over half the world's geopolitical entities are found; in the Western Hemisphere, where demand for domsat communications service appears especially great; and at the Indian Ocean basin longitudes, where satellites
must be placed to serve the large Eurasian countries. 6
In recognition of the potential impact of geostationary orbit scarcity on
proliferation of domsat communications service, the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) passed a resolution at its 1979 World Administrative Radio Conference (WARC '79) which called for the
convocation of a special world conference "to guarantee in practice for all
countries equitable access to the geostationary-satellite orbit and the frequency bands allocated to the space services." 7 This conference is commonly referred to as the "Space WARC" and will meet in July 1985.8 A
recent memorandum prepared jointly by the Department of State, the
National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA)
and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) refers to the Space
WARC as "by far the most important and comprehensive conference ever
to affect space telecommunications." 9
Several international orbit/spectrum management mechanisms have
been proposed for consideration at the 1985 Space WARC. 10 Each of them
ostensibly "guarantees in practice equitable access to the geostationarysatellite orbit and the frequency bands allocated to the space services." 1
This article provides a comparative legal assessment under United States
and international law of these various approaches to international manage2
ment of the "orbit/spectrum resource." 1

COMPARATIVE LEGAL ASSESSMENT
Legal Criteria
Analysis of United States and international law concerning geostationary
satellite communications reveals two fundamental legal doctrines. These
doctrines may be used as legal criteria for evaluating the various approaches to international management of the orbit/spectrum which may
be considered at the 1985 Space WARC. The first legal doctrine, normally
referred to as "open entry" policy, encompasses the legal principles and
rules which are relevant to satellite communications service within the
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United States. The second legal doctrine, referred to as "equitable access"
policy, encompasses the international legal principles and rules adhered to
by the United States which are relevant to satellite communications service
outside the United States. Hence "open entry" and "equitable access" are
the legal criteria for evaluating various approaches to international management of the orbit/spectrum.

Open Enfty
Open entry may be defined as the legal basis for satisfying United States
domestic satellite communications requirements. Its statutory foundation
has been identified by the FCC as Section 1 of the Communications Act
of 1934, which mandates the availability:
to all people of the United States [of] a rapid, efficient, nationwide, and
worldwide wire and radio communication service with adequate facilities at
reasonable charges. 13
The open entry doctrine has been developed principally in FCC decisions, 14 but has been affirmed by the Federal courts. 15 These decisions
reveal the following chain of reasoning as the justification for open entry:
1.

2.

Insufficient information precludes accurate administrative determination of changing requirements for domestic satellite communications service. 16
A competitive market is able, through price signals, to satisfy
changing requirements for domestic satellite communications ser-

vice. 17
3.

4.
5.
6.

A domsat market can be competitive only if new entry is assured
and if existing entrants have an opportunity to increase their market share. 18
New entry and growth in the domsat market is possible only in the
absence of extended administrative delays. 19
New entry and growth in the domsat market can be assured only
20
to the extent that orbit/spectrum assignments remain available.
Continued availability of orbit/spectrum assignments, and minimal administrative delays, may require that technical efficiency be

mandated. 21
Hence, to the extent that an international approach to orbit/spectrum
management provides for continued availability of requested satellite assignments without inhibitive administrative delay, it will allow the U.S.
to maintain a competitive domestic satellite communications market. This
competitive market, in turn, is necessary as a matter of United States law
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for the satisfaction of domestic satellite communications requirements. 22
Continued availability of requested satellite assignments, therefore, is the
essence of the open entry criteria.
In practice, currently requested satellite assignments may endanger the
continued availability of subsequently requested assignments. In such a
case, the open entiy doctrine will compromise currently requested satellite
assignments in order to ensure continued availability of assignments for
new entry into the domsat market, because the competitiveness of the
domsat market is more sensitive to entry opportunity than to the particular
technical nature of the requested entry opportunity. For this reason,
domestic satellite law permits administratively mandated efficiency, such
as reduced orbital spacing or minimum satellite communication capacity,
but only to the extent necessary to guarantee new (including growth of
existing systems) entry opportunities. 23
Thus, for purposes of legally evaluating Space WARC proposals, the
open entry criteria is generally an increasing function of continued availability to the United States of requested satellite assignments. However, at
that point in time when requested satellite assignments jeopardize availability of future assignments, the open entry criteria becomes an increasing
function of the United States' ability to mandate greater technical efficiency with minimal impact upon requested satellite assignments.
Equitable Access
Equitable access may be defined as the international legal basis for satisfying worldwide satellite communications requirements. Just as open entry
policy relies upon entrepreneurial initiative to satisfy United States satellite communications requirements, 24 the equitable access doctrine relies
upon sovereign initiative to satisfy worldwide satellite communications
requirements.
The equitable access doctrine finds legal expression in several treaties
binding upon the United States. Article 33 of the ITU Convention 25 mandates efficient use of orbit/spectrum "so that countries or groups of countries may have equitable access ...." The purposes of the ITU, stated in
article 4 of the Convention, include international cooperative efforts toward the "creation, development and improvement" of telecommunications systems, "notably those using space techniques"-a mandate wholly
consistent with equitable access to the orbit/spectrum. 26
Equitable access to the orbit/spectrum is also assured under the Outer
Space Treaty of 1967, which holds space to "be the province of all mankind" and open for "use by all States without discrimination of any kind.
... 27 Certain equatorial countries have argued that special legal principles
apply to that portion of outer space occupied by geostationary satellites. 28
These claims are not, however, binding upon other states and are deemed

REGULATION OF GEOSTATIONARY ORBIT

17

by America's leading space law authorities to be without international
29
legal support.
The equitable access doctrine is also expressed in the INTELSAT Agreement, article II of which calls for the establishment of a global satellite
system "[w]ith full regard for the principles" of universal access and the
"most equitable use of the radio frequency spectrum and of orbital
space." 30 A similar commitment to the equitable access doctrine may be
found in the INMARSAT Convention. 31
The equitable access doctrine, therefore, mandates that opportunities
must exist for all countries to satisfy their requirements for satellite communications service. The determination of these requirements, and the
method of satisfying them, is left to the "sovereign initiative" of each
country. As noted earlier, the United States exercises its sovereign initiative by allowing marketplace forces to determine and satisfy domsat re32
quirements.
To the extent, therefore, that an international approach to orbit/spectrum management provides for continued availability of internationally
requested satellite assignments, it allows all countries an opportunity to
satisfy their own satellite communications requirements. This assurance of
sovereign initiative with respect to satellite communications systems, in
turn, is required as a matter of international law for the satisfaction of
worldwide orbit/spectrum requirements. 33 Continued international availability of requested satellite assignments, therefore, is the essence of the
equitable access criteria.
As in the domestic arena, however, it is necessary to consider the point
in time when currently requested satellite assignments endanger the continued availability of subsequently requested assignments. This is, of
course, the central issue of the Space WARC. 34 The equitable access doctrine will compromise currently requested and used satellite assignments
in order to ensure continued assignment availability. 35 The ITU's technical
requirements, 3 6 coordination procedures, 37 and broadcast satellite service
plan 38 each constrain the latitude of existing and/or prospective satellite
systems so that continued assignment availability is assured. The equitable
access doctrine operates in this manner because the efficacy of satisfying
worldwide domsat.requirements via sovereign initiative depends more on
assurance of entry opportunity than on the particular technical nature of
each request.
As with the open entry doctrine, the equitable access doctrine constrains
the latitude of current orbit/spectrum utilization only to the extent necessary to assure continued access opportunities. This is because, aside from
that point in time when opportunities for universal sharing of the orbit/
spectrum become problematic, equitable access is a simple increasing function of the availability of requested satellite assignments. Any constraint
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upon currently requested and used satellite systems in excess of that needed to assure continued assignment availability would constitute a net
decrement of sovereign initiative and, thereby, only undermine the equitable access doctrine. In short, equitable access means all requests for orbit/
spectrum must be satisfied, subject to the condition that the magnitude of
requests will be compromised to the extent necessary to ensure an ability
to satisfy future requests without inhibitive administrative delay.
Summary of Legal Criteriafor Evaluating International
Orbit/Spectrum Management Approaches
For convenience, the preceding descriptions of fundamental United States
and international legal criteria for the evaluation of approaches to orbit/
spectrum management are summarized below.
a)

b)

Open Entry Criteria:
(i) An increasing function of availability to the United States of
requested satellite assignments, for all times when requested
and used satellite assignments do not preclude new entry into
the domsat market.
(ii) An increasing function of United States' ability to mandate the
greatest amount of technical efficiency in use of the orbit/
spectrum for the least amount of constraint upon domsat system, for all times when currently requested and used satellite
assignments preclude new entry into the domsat market.
Equitable Access Criteria
(i) An increasing function of availability to all countries and
groups of countries of requested satellite assignments, for all
times when currently requested and used satellite assignments
do not impair future availability of satellite assignments.
(ii) An increasing function of global ability to ensure future availability of satellite assignments with the least constraint upon
currently requested and used satellite assignments, for all times
when currently requested and used satellite assignments endanger the continued availability of subsequently requested
assignments.

The most striking fact arising from this comparison is that the controlling legal doctrines under both United States and international law are
structurally identical.39 In both cases, the fundamental mandate is that there
be continued availability of requested satellite assignments. Also, for both
doctrines, the fundamental mandate is qualified when currently requested
and used satellite assignments begin to impair the availability of future
satellite assignments. Moreover, at such times when future assignment
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availability appears problematic, both doctrines mandate that the nature of
requested satellite assignments be modified. Finally, both doctrines require
that administrative modifications of the nature of satellite assignments be
no greater than is necessary to assure continued availability of future
satellite assignments. Such structural consistency between United States
and international law is very gratifying.
This structural consistency is an especially interesting finding because
the two doctrines arose from very different assumptions. Open entry, it
will be recalled, is necessary to effectuate a competitive market in domestic
satellite communications service within the United States. A competitive
market relies critically upon continuous possibilities for the exercise of
entrepreneurial initiative. Equitable access, by contrast, is needed to ensure
the rights of all countries to utilize a resource, the geostationary orbit,
which is "the province of all mankind." Universal utilization of a res
communes depends critically upon continuous possibilities for the exercise
of sovereign initiative. Hence, while the open entry and equitable access
doctrines have unique origins, they generate a common legal mandate:
adequate provision for satellite initiatives, entrepreneurial or sovereign,
40
must always exist.
Application of Legal Criteria to Space WARC
Orbit/Spectrum Management Options
Given this exposition of the controlling legal doctrines, this article next
examines a wide array of proposals for global management of the orbit/
spectrum resource. These proposals have been suggested as approaches the
Space WARC may adopt to "guarantee in practice, for all countries, equitable access to the geostationary orbit and frequency bands allocated to
space services." 41 The purpose of the analysis is to assess the relative
consistency of the proposals with the open entry and equitable access
doctrines, and thereby provide advice to United States and international
policymakers as to preferred approaches. Each approach to international
orbit/spectrum management is first described in terms of its basic characteristics. 42 Following the description comes legal analyses in terms of open
entry (U.S. law) and equitable access (international law) criteria. 43
Separate legal analyses in terms of open entry and equitable access are
required, despite the structural identity of the two doctrines, because legal
analysis consists of applying doctrine to real world situations. The two real
world situations of concern in this article are, respectively, satisfaction of
the domestic satellite communications requirements of the United States
and of all countries? With regard to United States requirements, it is the
open entry doctrine which states the controlling legal rules. With regard
to the simultaneous satisfaction of all countries' requirements, it is the
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equitable access doctrine which provides legal guidance. As will be seen
below, while the structure of legal analysis is the same for both United
States and worldwide requirements, the various orbit/spectrum management options have differential consistency with open entry and equitable
access doctrines.
Detailed Allotment Plans (Long Term)
Description
This type of orbit/spectrum management option involves a "Plan" which
sets out firm, long-term allotment of frequencies or channels, associated
orbital locations, and service areas to each and every ITU Administration.
The Plan would also establish technical implementation and operational
parameters or parameter ranges associated with the use of these allotments.
New requirements would be accommodated only if they did not cause
unacceptable interference to those networks established by the Plan. In
essence, this approach entails deciding how many satellite assignments are
possible with existing technology and then apportioning these assignments among countries for a long period of time. This approach was
employed for the broadcast satellite service downlink in ITU Regions 1 and
3 in 1977. In that case each country received approximately four satellite
assignments per time zone within its borders for a period of twenty
years. 44
Legal Evaluation in Terms of Open Entry Criterion
The ability of detailed allotment (long term) plans to satisfy the open entry
criterion depends upon whether United States allotments are (1) sufficient
in number and (2) broad enough in technical specification to accommodate
all FCC applications for domsat systems. The need to provide long term
assignments for all countries, however, necessitates well-defined technical
specifications and a ceiling on the number of United States allotments.
It is not possible to predict whether the number of United States allotments will be sufficient to meet the requests of domsat applicants. As the
number of minimum allotments per country increases, though, and as the
number of countries receiving minimum allotments increases, it becomes
increasingly likely that the United States may find itself with an insufficient number of allotments to satisfy entrepreneurial requests.
It is fairly probable, however, that the tight specification of technical
parameters inherent in a long-term, a priori plan will make it difficult, if not
impossible, for the FCC to satisfy requests for domsat authority which are
inconsistent with the technical parameters specified in the Plan. For example, wideband, high-power flux density approaches to satellite communications, such as contiguous or scanning spot beam systems, may be
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impossible to accommodate within a plan designed for conventional domsats. 45
At that point in time when currently requested and used assignments
preclude new assignments, the open entry criterion varies directly with the
FCC's ability to mandate technical efficiency and thereby permit new
domsat entry (including growth of existing systems). The tightly specified
interference parameters of a long-term plan, however, sharply constrain
the ability of ITU administrations to squeeze unplanned systems within a
planned allotment.
Legal Evaluation in Terms of Equitable Access Criterion
A long-term, detailed allotment plan will satisfy equitable access criteria
to the extent it can provide the number and nature of satellite assignments
requested worldwide. The ability to provide the number of requested satellite assignments is very uncertain in light of unknown global demand for
the orbit/spectrum. However, insofar as very improbable users of the
orbit/spectrum for domsat requirements receive a minimum number of
allotments, there will generally be fewer allotments left for countries
which are more likely to implement domsat systems. A long-term, detailed
allotment plan is unlikely to be able to satisfy the nature of requested
assignments which depart significantly from those provided for in the
Plan.
At that point in time when currently requested and used satellite assignments endanger the continued availability of subsequently requested assignments, a long-term, detailed allotment plan does not offer any
dependable mechanism for ensuring future availability of satellite assignments. While a plan revision is possible, existing satellite systems and
vacant but vested allotments will make it difficult to engineer greater
orbit/spectrum efficiency.
Periodically Revised Detailed Allotment Plan
Description
This approach is identical to the long-term, detailed allotment plan except
that conferences would be convened periodically, every three to five years,
to revise the technical parameters and regulatory procedures for the plan
and to accommodate new requirements. At each conference it would be
understood that all of the existing networks and all of the new or modified
requirements would be accommodated. During the interval between conferences, new requirements would be accommodated to the extent that
they did not cause unacceptable interference to networks in the plan. 46
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Legal Evaluation in Terms of Open Entry Criterion
A periodically-revised, detailed allotment plan is better able to accommodate the number of requested United States domsat systems than a longterm plan because the former accommodates new requirements periodically through plan revisions. Since,, however, a percentage of the resource
remains inaccessible due to universal distribution of orbit/spectrum allotments, it remains possible that some number of an administration's requirements may not be accommodated despite interim technological
advances.
It is fairly probable that a periodically revised detailed allotment plan
will not accommodate the nature of all requested assignments, because new
requirements are accommodated only to the extent that they do not cause
unacceptable interference with networks in the plan. Thus, system compromise will be necessary even with respect to the "paper" satellite networks which have not been implemented. 47 These technical compromises
will be less severe, however, than under a long-term plan, as evolving
technology can be taken into account at periodic conferences which revise
the plan.
As with a long-term plan, periodically revised plans offer little opportunity for the United States to create additional access opportunities within United States allotments. If the periodic revisions allow greater
independence between national allotments, however, the United States
could gain additional latitude to mandate greater technical efficiency in
national systems.
Equitable Access Criterion
A periodically revised plan would offer an improved ability to accommodate both the number and nature of internationally requested satellite
assignments over that offered by long-term plans. However, it remains
probable that interference parameters of the plan, even as revised, will
place limits on the number and nature of satellite assignments in excess of
those which would exist without a plan, particularly in those portions of
the world where smaller countries enjoy little geographical isolation from
neighboring countries.
The ability to take technological advances into account at three to five
year intervals improves significantly the theoretical possibility of global
action to increase the number of satellite networks which can be accommodated. However, the need to cause no interference to existing networks
under the plan mitigates the extent to which the plan can be made more
efficient.
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Detailed Allotment Plan with Future Requirements Reserve
Description
This option is identical in concept to the previous two types of detailed
adotment plans fxcept that not all of the technologically feasible satellite
assignments would be allotted to countries at the initial planning conference. Instead, some fraction of the technologically feasible satellite assignments would be held by the ITU in a "future requirements reserve."
Conferences to revise the plan would still be held periodically, probably
on the order of every ten years. If a country depleted its allotment of
satellite assignments before the next scheduled conference it could satisfy
its requirements from the "future requirements reserve." Also, at periodically reconvened conferences new technological advances could be taken
into account to increase the number of satellite assignments allotted to
48
countries and to replenish the "future requirements reserve."
Open Entry and Equitable Access
The analysis of the long-term and periodically revised, detailed allotment
plan is generally applicable to this type of plan as well. To the extent that
the reserve is created by reducing the size of initial national allotments, but
not floor allotments, below the level for other detailed allotment plans,
countries will be more likely to find themselves, over time, unable to
obtain requested satellite assignments under the Plan. 49 They can then,
however, access the reserve and compensate for any shortfall of orbit/
spectrum. Based on this scenario, it cannot be said with any certainty
whether a requirements reserve offers either the United States or any other
country a greater ability to secure satellite assignments than the other
detailed allotment methods.
If the reserve is created, though, by reducing the floor allotment to all
countries below that which would exist for other detailed allotment plans,
then both the United States and other countries would experience some
increase in their ability to secure requested satellite assignments. This is
due to a diminution in the extent to which allotments are distributed, and
could be accomplished as well without a reserve.
GuaranteedAccess by Multilateral Coordination
Description
This approach is fundamentally different from the previous three "planning" approaches whereby the entire orbit/spectrum resource is, at a single
point in time, distributed among all countries regardless of their need for
any satellite communications service. Under the multilateral coordination
approach, there would be no advance distribution of satellite assignments
to all countries. Instead, when a country wished to launch a new satellite
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system, it would follow existing procedures stated in article 11 of the ITU
Radio Regulations. These Regulations provide that advance notification be
given to all countries of a new satellite system. If the new satellite system
would cause harmful interference to an existing satellite system of another
country or group of countries, the new satellite system could not receive
"international recognition," which carries with it certain valuable legal
rights, until the potential for interference were eliminated. It is this situation which many countries fear will block their access to the geostationary
orbit. 50
The multilateral coordination approach addresses this problem by requiring that the new satellite system be accommodated at a special meeting
of the countries or groups of countries which are responsible for the
satellite systems involved. There has been no articulation of exactly how
the new satellite system would be accommodated. This method could,
however, involve forced relocation of the existing satellites which would
suffer interference from the new satellite system.
Legal Analysis in Terms of Open Entry Criterion
Multilateral coordination is highly consistent with United States open
entry policy because a high probability exists that both the number and
nature of requested domsat assignments will be available. Since no planning is involved, the entire orbit/spectrum resource, less that portion in
actual use or subject to near-term coordination, is potentially available to
the United States.
When inability to satisfy a new non-United States orbit/spectrum requirement necessitates a special multilateral coordination meeting, orbit/
spectrum availability to the United States would not be significantly impaired. This is so because (1) the geographical isolation of the United States
limits significantly the number of meetings for which its attendance would
be necessary; (2) the meetings would not deplete orbit/spectrum availability since they would deal only with the actual requirements of administrations prepared to orbit satellite systems (as opposed to the need to provide
for theoretical requirements of all administrations under planning); and (3)
the meetings would be able to accommodate new requirements in light of
evolving technology, thereby further minimizing the drain on orbit/spectrum availability. For that point in time when currently requested and used
domsat assignments do appear to preclude new domestic entry, the FCC
will retain broad latitude to mandate increased technical efficiency under
the multilateral coordination approach.
Legal Evaluation in Terms of Equitable Access Criterion
The multilateral coordination approach does not fare as well under equitable access criteria as it does under open access because, for most countries
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or groups of countries, dedicated domsat systems will be initiated only
after several developed country satellite systems are in orbit. This implies
a much higher probability of need to resort to special multilateral coordination meetings than will be experienced by earlier developers of the
orbit/spectrum.
The need to resort to special multilateral coordination meetings is, itself,
a compromise of satellite assignment availability and, therefore, a denigration of the equitable access doctrine. More importantly, however, is the
fact that the special multilateral coordination meetings would probably not
yield the level of satellite assignment availability developing countries
want except under the equitable access doctrine. While this method states
that "a means would be found to accommodate the new requirement," the
means will necessitate compromise of the new requirement in proportion
to the extent that the desired transmission parameters conflict with previously coordinated and registered systems. This compromise will clearly
become greater over time, particularly for countries which enjoy little
geographical isolation. Furthermore, the time and expense needed to participate in special multilateral coordination meetings is likely to be viewed
by latecomers to orbit/spectrum exploitation as a significant impediment
to satellite assignment availability.
With regard to that point in time when international availability of
satellite assignment does, in fact, become problematic, the special multilateral coordination meeting would be the key tool by which future availability of satellite assignment is assured. To be consistent with the equitable'
access doctrine, this tool must yield the greatest amount of satellite assignment availability for the least constraint upon existing assignments. Because the special meetings may take into account evolving technology and
are coordinative in nature, they yield new assignment availability with
minimal impact on existing satellite systems. As discussed earlier, however, the nature and, to a lesser extent, the number of new assignments
effected at special meetings may very well fall short of that expected by
latecomers to the orbit/spectrum resource.
Periodic Revision of Coordination Procedures
Description
This approach is similar to that of multilateral coordination insofar as it
does not contemplate an a priori allotment of the orbit/spectrum to all
countries. The distinctive feature of this approach is that it contemplates
constant and possibly major revisions to the basic procedures stated in
article 11 of the Radio Regulations which specify the manner in which new
satellite systems can be placed into orbit without causing interference to
existing satellite systems. 51 These coordination procedures may be revised
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in a minor manner, to simply reduce their considerable complexity, or they
might conceivably be so significantly revised as to, for example, require
satellites of developed countries to incur all modifications necessary to
avoid interference with new satellite systems of developing countries.
Legal Analysis in Terms of Open Entry Criterion
Periodic revision of coordination procedures to enhance orbit/spectrum
efficiency is wholly consistent with the United States policy of open entry.
The kernel of open entry is satellite assignment availability; by improving
the coordination process and by increasing the technical efficiency of orbit/spectrum systems, the United States has its best possible assurance of
adequate satellite assignments to meet domestic requirements. This method also leaves the FCC broad latitude to create new domsat entry opportunities via domestic technical efficiency regulations more stringent than
those mandated by the ITU.
It is possible that continuous international revision of coordination
procedures and baseline transmission characteristics may introduce so
much uncertainty that the FCC domsat authorization process will not
operate expeditiously. It is also possible that coordination procedures may
be revised in such a manner that existing satellite networks may have to
incur greater modifications than is now necessary. For example, failure to
effect timely coordination with a planned satellite system could possibly
be deemed a waiver by the administration representing registered systems
of claims of harmful interference from the planned system. The uncertainty introduced by periodic revision of coordination procedures and technical parameters may, therefore, significantly undermine open entry policies.
Legal Evaluation in Terms of Equitable Access Criterion
The analysis of the multilateral coordination method is largely applicable
here as well. The key difference is that, under this method, administrations
throughout the world must rely wholly upon revisions to the coordination
procedures and ITU technical parameters, instead of special multilateral
coordination meetings, as a source of new satellite assignment availability.
If the coordination procedures are revised to place significant bargaining
power in the hands of latecomers to orbit/spectrum development, then
developing countries will probably rate this method high under equitable
access criteria. But the likelihood of such a revision being made is very
uncertain. If, on the other hand, the revisions essentially leave the coordination procedures as they are but heighten the technical requirements
placed on satellite networks, this method will probably be viewed as
detracting from orbit/spectrum availability for the same reasons stated in
the discussion of multilateral coordination.
ITU efforts under this method to mandate greater satellite assignment
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availability will probably be rather slow and of uncertain impact. Tighter
technical constraints may be resisted by developing countries as inconsistent with their satellite development plans and capabilities.
Resource Pool Planning
Description
This method involves the creation of a resource pool consisting of blocks
of the spectrum associated with a portion of the orbital arc. This resource
pool would be managed by an international entity, such as the ITU. When
a country plans to orbit a new communications satellite system it forwards
its service requirements to the pool manager. The pool manager provides
for the requested service requirements from the resource pool and "packs"
the requested assignments of various countries in a manner which causes
52
the least depletion of the pool.
Legal Evaluation in Terms of Open Entry Criterion
Resource pool planning should allow the United States a maximum number of requested satellite assignments because no artificial ceiling is placed
on resource availability as under formal plans, where resource units are
predistributed to all administrations. Resource pool planning will probably
not allow, however, maximum United States latitude in the nature of
requested satellite assignments. The nature of satellite assignments, including at least orbital location, and probably other design parameters as
well, would be subject to the discretion (which may be appropriately
circumscribed) of the pool "manager." The managing entity "packs" requested assignments within the pool in a manner which causes the least
depletion of the pool and the least, if any, impact on existing assignments.
The constraints imposed on system architecture as a result of the packing
process probably exceed those which result from the existing technical
coordination process of article 11 of the ITU Radio Regulations. However,
these constraints may not be significant for the United States due to its
geographical isolation. Furthermore, the increment in ability to accommodate new satellite systems through efficient resource pool management
largely offsets any impairment of satellite design flexibility. As noted
earlier, the open entry policy is more sensitive to the existence of entry
opportunity than it is to the particularnature of requested entry opportunities.
Resource pool planning would have an uncertain effect on the FCC's
ability to mandate greater orbit/spectrum efficiency. The FCC would remain free to set orbit/spectrum efficiency standards and to submit only
those requested assignments to the pool manager which comply with such
standards (thereby facilitating the manager's chores). On the other hand,
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the pool manager may pack the resource in such a manner as to limit
significantly the utility of FCC actions aimed at achieving greater orbit/
spectrum efficiency. Once again, however, the geographical isolation of the
United States is a factor that should allow the FCC significant flexibility.
Legal Evaluation in Terms of Equitable Access Criterion
Resource pool planning should be able to accommodate the number of
internationally requested satellite assignments with less time delay and
administrative expense than would be involved for latecomers under coordination procedure-based methods. The need to pack newly requested
satellite assignments with minimal disruption to existing networks, minimal depletion of remaining resource units, and with regard to evolving
technology, however, implies that latecomers to the orbit/spectrum resource may face significant design constraints. These constraints, if they
amount to obstacles to domsat deployment, undermine the equitable access doctrine.
The ability of the international regime to mandate greater entry opportunity at times and places of orbit/spectrum congestion is highly dependent on the powers given to the pool manager. The need to accommodate
already packed networks, however, militates against any significant ITU
ability to create new access opportunities.
Institutional Provision or Planning
Description
This method contemplates international institutional provision of satellite
service as a supplement to separate domsat systems. s5 Institutional provision of domsat service is an orbit/spectrum management approach because
guaranteed access to the institutional system would serve as a substitute
for the need to reserve fractions of orbit/spectrum for all countries. This
approach contemplates the ability of existing, or perhaps modified, coordination procedures to manage adequately the orbit/spectrum once the requirements of international latecomers are guaranteed by international or
regional operating institutions. 5 4 Article Ill(e) of the INTELSAT Agreement gives INTELSAT, the largest existing international institution providing intercontinental, transborder and domestic satellite service, the
authority to provide such institutional access:
INTELSAT may, on request and under appropriate terms and conditions, provide satellites or associated facilities separate from the
INTELSAT space segment for:
(i) domestic public telecommunications service in territories under
the jurisdiction of one or more Parties;
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(ii) international public telecommunications services between or
among territories under the jurisdiction of two or more Parties;
(iii) specialized telecommunications services, other than for military purposes;
provided that the efficient and economic operation of the INTEL55
SAT space segment is not unfavorably affected in any way.
Legal Evaluation in Terms of Open Entry Criterion
This approach gives the United States the maximum availability of requested satellite assignments in terms of both number and technical nature. No artificial ceiling would exist on the number of allotments available
to the United States (as exists under planning approaches) and coordination procedures permit maximum flexibility in accommodating different
types of satellite systems.
It may be argued that the proliferation of institutional systems will
complicate coordination and thereby reduce the availability of satellite
assignments to the United States. The geographical isolation of the United
States, however, minimizes this problem significantly. Furthermore, the
United States would be coordinating with real systems in real time, and
can therefore take advantage of technological innovations to reduce coordination problems. Also, under this approach the FCC would retain maximum flexibility to mandate greater efficiency in United States use of the
orbit/spectrum should new entry opportunities become problematic.
Legal Evaluation in Terms of Equitable Access Criterion
Institutional provision of domsat service, supplementary to sovereign networks, would also provide the maximum availability of satellite assignments worldwide. For small countries, access is guaranteed to the
institutional system. 56 Access would be much greater under either long or
short-term formal plans, where the small country is guaranteed only certain interference-free transmission parameters and actual satellite service
remains unlikely. Access would also be greater than under pure coordination procedure-based approaches, where latecomers can face significant
coordinative hurdles in registering their space systems. With institutional
provision of domsat service, coordination will be shared among all administrations participating in the institutional arrangement.
Developing countries that do not wish to participate in an institutional
arrangement to provide domsat service (probably the larger states such as
India) may feel that this method does not adequately assure future satellite
assignment availability. India has already complained of coordination
difficulties with INTELSAT and the Soviet Union. 57 Hence, some uncer-
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tainty remains as to how well institutional provision of international domsat service effectuates the equitable access doctrine.
As to international efforts toward mandating greater access opportunity
at times of orbit/spectrum crowding, the institutional provision approach
appears preferable to other approaches because global satellite system
decision-making is concentrated in entities which are cognizant and appreciative of technological advances. Nevertheless, with many systems
already on orbit in need of protection, any significant enhancement of
orbit/spectrum availability will be a gradual process.

JURIMETRIC SYNTHESIS
In this section, the article synthesizes, with the aid of symbolic functional
notation, the legal and technical considerations explained earlier. The fundamental decision of the Space WARC is of an allotment nature: that is,
in what way should the orbit/spectrum be associated with particular countries? Let this decision be denoted Da. The allotment decision, Da, is a
function of, i.e., it depends upon, consistency with policies which require
continual availability of requested satellite assignments. Letting p represent this common mandate of open entry and equitable access, it may then
be said that Da=f(p).
Now p itself may be represented as the difference between satellite
assignment supply and satellite assignment demand. Both the supply of
and demand for satellite assignments are functions of time. Letting t represent time, Rd(t) represent the rate of satellite assignment demand and R.
(t) represent the rate of satellite assignment supply, it may be stated that
p=f(t)=Rs(t)-Rd(t). Clearly if for a particular allotment option Rd(t)
exceeded Rs(t), then p would assume a negative value and such an allotment decision would not be made.
Let it be assumed that Rd(t) is independent of the approach to orbit/
spectrum management. The rate of supply of satellite assignments, Rs(t),
depends in addition on the number of satellite allotments a management
approach, M, provides, and on technological innovations, I. Consider first
only the categories of planning methods (represented with a subscripted
p) and coordination methods (represented with a subscripted c). For planning methods, R8 p=Mp+Ip, and for coordination procedure methods, Rsc
= Mc + Ic. But it is universally agreed that Ip< Icbecause plans cannot take
into account technological innovations which do not yet exist. 58 Hence
Rsp > Rc only if Mp > Mc+ (Ic-Ip). But, to the contrary, Mp < Mc because,
in a plan, the total number of allotments is of a magnitude determined by
the need to provide interference protection to satellite systems which do
not now and may never exist: i.e., the portion of the "floor allotments"
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provided to all countries which will not be utilized. 59 Whereas in a coordination procedure approach, M,, the allotments are of a magnitude determined only by the need to provide interference protection to existing or
imminently deployed satellite systems. Since the number of all real satellite systems is much less than the number of all real plus hypothetical
satellite systems, M, is always greater than Mp. Thus Rc > Rsp and Rs Rd must be greater for coordination methods than planning methods.
Based on these considerations, the Space WARC decision Da = f(p) should
be to rely upon coordination procedures.
Now it is appropriate to consider particular variations of planning method approaches whereby the plan is revised in one way or another at
periodic intervals. 60 The effect of periodic revision is to provide Ip with a
value which approaches I in the limit when periodic revisions become
continuous. However, since the periodically revised planning methods do
not alter the universal allotment of the orbit/spectrum which characterizes
all planning methods, Mp remains less than M,. That is, notwithstanding
changes in technology which increase the overall availability of satellite
assignments, the need to protect the hypothetical assignments of countries
without any need for satellite service will always result in fewer available
assignments than if protection need be afforded only to real systems.
Hence, while periodically revised plans enjoy a Rs(t) value higher than that
of long-term plans, due solely to a limit condition at which Ip= I,, the Rsp
remains less than R. because Mp remains less than M. Therefore, even
continuously revised plans have a lower R, - Rd value than do coordination
methods of orbit/spectrum management. The Space WARC decision,
Da, should thus continue to favor the latter approach.
Finally, consider the perspective of a country whose Ri(t) will never
exceed the Rsp(t). For such a country, there may be no perceived advantage
in a coordination procedure approach to orbit/spectrum management.
However, such a country may perceive ancillary. benefits of a non-legal
nature in a planning method approach, its legal requirements being met by
the condition that Rsp(t)> Rd(t). These ancillary benefits may include
geopolitical gains in relations with Western industrialized states, economic
gains from leasing its allotment of unused orbit/spectrum and transfer of
expenses incurred obtaining satellite assignments from the country itself,
presumably at an early stage of industrialization, to the ITU and its Consultative Committee on International Radio (CCIR), where the costs (including significant computing resources) of preparing plans are borne by
the world community.
If countries described in the preceding paragraph represent a large
majority of all states, and given that all states have equal standing under
international law, such states may be able to foist the orbit/spectrum
management model which meets their interests upon the world communi-
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ty. If that model entails planning, such a result would appear to be legally
unacceptable to states for whom Rsp(t) < Rd(t). 61 In this event, a dilemma
would be reached.
Taking now the perspective of the United States as a country for whom
Rsp(t) < Rd(t), there are at least three ways out of this dilemma. First, the
United States may change its domestic laws to restrict Rd(t). Second, the
United States may maintain its domestic legal policies and refuse to ratify
any Space WARC treaty that mandates planning. And third, the United
States may promote a coordination procedure approach which also addresses the eco-geopolitical bases upon which support for planning rests.
The first and second approaches appear costly to United States domestic
and international interests, respectively. The third approach would be met
by the "Institutional Provision" method of orbit/spectrum management.
While the United States might incur costs in facilitating the establishment
of global domestic satellite communications service, much if not most of
these expenses would be passed on to the United States satellite communications industry. 62 Given a choice between a partnership with the United
States and other countries in a global domsat system, and its accompanying
advantage of near-term access to advanced satellite communications technology, or foresaking the same if support is given for a planning method,
it appears likely that orbit/spectrum management based on planning
63
would be unable to muster majority support at the Space WARC.
It must be recalled that lawmaking is a consensual activity. 64 As the
universe of entities from whom consensus is required grows more diverse,
the substance of any consensus achieved invariably becomes more diffuse. 65 Ambiguity must supplant specificity if divergent interests are to
find common ground.

The jurimetric synthesis has shown that the common and universally
agreed upon mandate of the open entry and equitable access doctrines may
be met only by coordination procedure approaches for countries whose
rate of growth in satellite assignment demand exceeds the rate of growth
in satellite assignment supply under orbit/spectrum planning. However,
there are a majority of countries for whom the rate of growth in satellite

assignment demand is less than the rate of growth in satellite assignment
supply available through an orbit/spectrum plan. These countries are not
indifferent to the orbit/spectrum management approach because they can
benefit geopolitically and economically from the planning methods.
For a worldwide consensus to be achieved, the minority of technologically advanced states must either restrain satellite system growth or must
offer the less technologically developed states economic and geopolitical
benefits which exceed those associated with universal, a priori distribution
of the orbit/spectrum resource. The argument of this article is that the first
option is antithetical to United States policy, but that the second option
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is met by a worldwide partnership in domestic satellite communications
service, facilitated with United States financial and technical assistance.

CONCLUSION
The foregoing comparative legal assessment of international orbit/spectrum management approaches reveals substantial diversity in the consistency of these approaches with both United States and international law.
While the underlying principles of United States and international satellite
law, "open entry" and "equitable access," respectively, have been shown
to be structurally identical, they may yield different results when applied
to concrete orbit/spectrum management proposals. These disparate results
must, however, be expected, since analysis under United States law considers only the requirements of a single, technologically advanced country,
whereas analysis under international law must consider the varying needs
of over 150 countries with a wide spectrum of technological and economic
infrastructures.
From a systems perspective, the ideal orbit/spectrum management approach is one which is consonant with both United States and international
legal principles. Based on the foregoing analysis, the "Institutional Provision" approach appears to satisfy the criteria of both "open entry" and
"equitable access" to a greater degree than do any of the alternative approaches. It is therefore suggested that from the combined viewpoint of
both United States and international interests in global domestic satellite
communications service, the 1985 Space WARC should pursue the Institutional Provision approach as the best means of "guaranteeing in practice
for all countries equitable access to the geostationary-satellite orbit and
frequency bands allocated to the space services." 66

NOTES
I

See generally D. JANsxy 4 M. JERVCIdM, COMMUNICATION SATELLrrEs IN TmEGEoSTATIONARY

OR8rT (1983); J. MARTVn, COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE SYSTEMS (1978).
2 See generally D. JANsxY, WORLD ATLAS OF SATELLrrES (1983). When

this article was written,

the U.S. had four domestic satellite communications systems in place: Western Union's
Westar, RCA Americom's Satcom, Comsat General's Comstar and Satellite Business System's
digital Ku-Band network. Permission has been granted for the construction of new fixed
satellite systems by American Telephone & Telegraph, GTE Satellite, Hughes Aircraft Company, Spacecom, and Southern Pacific Communications. Permission has also been granted to
other firms to construct the initial phase of eight separate broadcast satellite systems. Applications are pending for permission to construct an additional six satellite systems by still
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other firms. Each of these satellite systems is capable of providing satellite communications
service to neighboring countries as well.
Total worldwide demand for non-broadcast satellite communications service has been
estimated at 10,530 36 MHz equivalent transponders by the year 2000. Each 36 MHz tran-

sponder is capable of conveying from one to four channels of television programming, or
approximately one thousand telephone circuits, depending on the technology employed.
Typical satellite configurations have evolved from 12 transponders in the 1970s to 24 transponders in the 1980s. If 24 transponder satellites remain typical through the 1990s, then
estimated worldwide demand for non-broadcast satellite service will support over 200 geostationary satellites by the year 2000. See Second Notice of Inquiry-Space WARC, Gen. Dkt.
No. 80-741, at § 14 (F.C.C. 17714, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Notice of Inquiry-Space WARC].
3 See,Levin, Orbit and Spectrum Resource Strategies: Third World Demands, TELECOM. POL'Y, June

1981, at 102. When assessing the future use of the geostationary orbit, broadcast satellite
service and defense communications satellites must also be considered. However, because
broadcast and defense satellites operate at different frequency bands from non-broadcast
satellites, they are considered separately for purposes of analyzing orbit/spectrum scarcity.
4 Licensing Space Stations in the Domestic Fixed-Satellite Service, Notice of Inquiry and
Proposed Rulemaking, 46 Fed. Reg. 57,067 (1981) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt.25) [hereinafter cited as Licensing of Space Stations].
5 See Hill, CorporateStar Wars: Domsats Battle for the Geostationary Orbit, SATELLITE COM., Aug.

1980, at 12.
6 The U.K., Sweden, France, West Germany, Austria, Luxemburg, Austria, Switzerland,
and Italy are each planning one or more fixed or broadcast satellite systems in addition to
a common user Eutelsat system. Nigeria has expressed interest in its own satellite system,
while the West African Post & Telegraph Union is studying a common user satellite system.
The Soviet Union has five separate domestic civil satellite communications systems. India,
Japan and Indonesia each have two satellites in orbit.
7 ITU, WORLD ADMINISTRATIVE RADIO CONFERENCE (1979), reprinted in President's Message to

Congress Transmitting the Radio Regulations (Geneva, 1979) and Final Protocol, Sen. Treaty
Doc. No. 97-21, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 74-75 (1981) [hereinafter cited as WARC-79].
8 See ITU, FINAL ACTS OF THE PLENIPOTENTIARY CONFERENCE (1982) [hereinafter cited as

WARC-82].
9 Dep't of State, Memorandum on the National Preparatory Program (1982).
10 See, e.g., Notice of Inquiry-Space WARC,. supra note 2.
11 See WARC-79 supra note 7. The entire text of Resolution 3 reads as follows:
considering

a)

that the geostationary-satellite orbit and the radio frequency spectrum are limited
natural resources and are utilized by space services;

b) That there is a need for equitable access to, and efficient and economical use of, these
resources by all countries as provided for in Article 33 of the International Telecommunication Convention (Malaga-Torremolinos, 1978) and Resolution 2;
c) That the utilization of radio frequencies and the geostationary-satellite orbit by
individual countries and groups of countries can take place at various points in time,
based on their requirements and the availability of the resources at their disposal;
d) That there are growing requirements all over the world for orbital position and
frequency assignments for the space services;
e) That in the use of the geostationary-satellite orbit for space services, attention should
be given to the relevant technical aspects concerning the special geographical situation of particular countries;
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resolves
1. That a world administrative radio conference shall be convened not later than 1984
to guarantee in practice for all countries equitable access to the geostationary-satellite
orbit and the frequency bands allocated to space services;
2. That this conference shall be held in two sessions;
3. That the first session shall:
3.1 Decide which space service and frequency bands should be planned;
3.2 Establish the principles, technical parameters and criteria for planning, including those for orbit and frequency assignments of the space services and
frequency bands identified as per para. 3.1, taking into account the relevant
technical aspects concerning the special geographical situation of particular
countries; and provide guidelines for associated regulatory procedures;
3.3 Establish guidelines for regulatory procedures in respect to services and
frequency bands not covered by para. 3.2;
3.4 Consider other possible approaches that could meet the objective of resolve
1;
4. That the second session shall be held not sooner than twelve months and not later
than eighteen months after the first session and implement the decisions taken at the
first session;
invites
1. The International Radio Consultative Committee to carry out preparatory studies and
provide the first session of the conference with technical information concerning
principles, criteria and technical parameters including those required for planning
space services;
2. The International Frequency Registration Board to prepare a report on the operation
of the procedures of Articles 11 and 13 including information about difficulties which
may be reported to the IFRB by administrations in gaining access to suitable orbital
locations and frequencies, and to circulate this report to administrations at least one
year before the first session of the conference;
3. The IFRB to carry out technical preparations for the conference in accordance with
the provisions of the Radio Regulations;
4. The administrations to examine all aspects of the matter with a view to submitting
proposals to the conference, and to cooperate actively in the above-mentioned work
of the CCIR and IFRB;
5. The Administrative Council to take all necessary steps for the convening of the
conference in accordance with this Resolution.
The dates for the first and second sessions were subsequently postponed to July, 1985 and
September, 1987 respectively. See WARC-82, supra note 8.
12 See generally Rothblatt, The Impact of InternationalSatellite Communications Law Upon Access to the
Geostationary Orbit and the Electromagnetic Spectrum, 16 TEx. INr'L L.J. 207 (1981) (examination of
various space WARC options).
13 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1976); see also Orbit Deployment Plan-Domestic Satellite, 84 F.C.C.2d
584, 602 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Orbit Deployment Plan].
14 See, e.g., Orbit Deployment Plan, 84 F.C.C.2d 584, Domestic Communications-Satellite
Facilities, 35 F.C.C.2d 844 (1972).
1 15 See, e.g., United States v. F.C.C., 652 F.2d 72 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Network Project v. F.C.C.,
511 F.2d 786, 797 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
16 Orbit Deployment Plan, 84 F.C.C.2d at 600, 602.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 601.
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19 Id. at 602 ("Having decided on a competitive, open entry policy for the domestic
satellite market, we were concerned that a domestic satellite operator be able to implement
its system promptly without needless and protracted administrative delays..."); seealso U.S.
v. FCC, 652 F.2d at 95-96.
20 Orbit Deployment Plan, 84 F.C.C.2d at 601 ("The development of a competitive market
structure ...depends on the Commission's ability to accommodate a sufficiently large number
of satellites in suitable orbital locations.").
21 Id. at 596 ("applicants are therefore put on notice that they may subsequently be
required to cease operation of twelve 36 MHz transponder satellites from independent orbital
locations if an insufficient number of orbital locations are available to accommodate higher
I
technology (capacity) satellites ...").
22 See generally NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION RsPoR4
(1981) (discussion of competitive market policies, trade issues, and telecommunications and
information policies).
23 See Licensing of Space Stations, supra note 4.
24 See supra notes 16-23 and accompanying text.
25 International Telecommunication Convention, October 25, 1973, art. 33, 28 U.S.T.
2495, 2529-30, T.I.A.S. No. 8572; see also Licensing of Space Stations, supra note 4 (would
amend arts. 33, 34 of the Convention, adding as relevant considerations the geographical
situation of individual countries and special needs of developing countries).
26
See International Telecommunication Convention, arts. 4(c), (e), 28 U.S.T. at 2512,2513;
see also G. CODDING & A. RurTKowsxi, THE ITU IN A CHANGING WORLD (1982), D. LEivE, INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONs AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1970).

27 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, opened for signature Jan. 27,
1967, Art. I, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 2412-13, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter cited
as Outer Space Treaty]. See generally C. CHRISTOL, TE MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OUrE
SPACE at 12-58 (1982) (definitive legal analysis of the Outer Space Treaty); Galloway, The
History and Development of Space Law: International Law and United States Law, 7 ANNALS OF AIR AND
SPACE L. 295 (1982) (cogent summary of the evolution of space law).
28 See The Bogota Declaration (Dec. 3, 1976), reprinted in 6 J. SPACE L. 193 (1978). Geostationary satellites lie in the plane of the earth's equator, directly above the equatorial states.
Those states have argued that the geostationary orbit is an integral part of their territory
because the equatorial plane is a gravitational phenomenon caused by the earth.
29
See, e.g., Gorove, GeostationaryOrbit: Issues of Law and Policy, 73 AM. J. INT'L L. 444,447 (1979).
30 Agreement Relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization
"INTELSAT", Aug. 20,1971, preamble & art. II, 23 U.S.T. 3813,3814,3818, T.I.A.S. No. 7532,
[hereinafter cited as INTELSAT Agreement]; see also R. CouNo, TE INTELSAT DrnNTIvE
ARRANGEMENTS: USHIuNG IN A NEw ERA IN SATELLITE TELECOMMUNICATIONS (1973).

31 Convention on the International Maritime Satellite Organization "INMARSAT," Sept.
3, 1976, art. 7, 34 U.S.T. 1, 5, T.I.A.S. No. 9605; see also Jasentuliyana, The Establishment of an
InternationalMaritime Satellite System, 2 ANNALS OF AIR & SPACE L 323, 327 (1977).
32 See Address by Brigadier General Martin Menter (U.S.A.F. Ret.), A.B.A. Institute on
Aviation Litigation and Space Law (May 28, 1982) (assessment of U.S. policy with regard to
space industrialization activities).
33 But c. Paper Presented by Harvey Levin, 95th Mtg. of the American Economic Ass'n
(Dec. 29, 1982) (contrasting regional and global strategies in orbit spectrum management).
34 See Notice of Inquiry-Space WARC, supra note 2.
35 The international legal order mandates this result because universal sharing of orbit/
spectrum, the premise of equitable access, is more sensitive to the existence of access oppor-
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tunity than to the particular technical nature of requested access opportunities. See Levin, The
Political Economy of Orbit Spectrum Leasing, this volume.
36 See WARC-79, supra note 7, at RR 428A ("all technical means available shall be used
to reduce, to the maximum extent practicable, the radiation over the territory of other
countries .. ").
37 See id. at 156-57. Briefly, coordination involves the publication of a proposed satellite
system's technical parameters, a subsequent exchange of prescribed information among ITU
administrations whose communications services may cause mutual interference and, if necessary, negotiations to alter the technical or operational characteristics of some or all systems
to eliminate interference. See also Colino, International Cooperation Between Satellite Systems: An
Overview of Current Practices and Future Prospects, 5 J. SPACE L. 65, 89-90 (1977).
38 See WARC-79, supra note 7, at App. 29A. Richard Butler, the Secretary-General of the
ITU, has noted that the plan incorporates "a collection of all the technical parameters necessary for the purpose of ensuring the optimum use of available resources." Butler, World
Administrative Radio Conference for Planning Broadcasting-SatelliteService, 5 J. SPACE L. 93, 98 (1977).
Under this plan, specific countries are assigned the frequencies and orbital positions they may
use for satellite broadcasting. The assignments derive from dividing the bandwidth into many
channels of lesser, more practical bandwidths; associating each group of channels with an
orbital position; and granting states the right to specific channels at specific orbital positions.
Most countries receive four channels, although depending on size, population and foreseeable
communication needs, some states are granted as many as sixty-five (the U.S.S.R.) and as few
as two (Brunei). See Mili, World Administrative Radio Conference for the Planning of the BroadcastingSatellite Service in Frequency Bands 11.7-12.2 GHz (in Regions 2 and 3) and 11.7-12.5 GHz (in Region
1), in PROCEEDINGS OF THE TwETr TriCOOQUUM ON THE LAw oF OUTER SPACE 346 (1978); see also
Johnsen, Service Date for Fixed Satellite Pressed, AviATioN WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, Sept. 10, 1979,
at 75. The plan was implemented for Regions 1 and 3. (Region I covers Europe, Africa, the
Soviet Union, Turkey, and the Mongolian People's Republic; Region 3 covers Asia, Oceania,
Australia and New Zealand).
The decision to extend the assignment plan to Region 2 (covering the western hemisphere)
was postponed, largely owing to American resistance. The matter will be decided at the 1983
regional conference. See ITU, FINAL ACTS or THE WARC FOR mHE PLANNING OF TM BROADCASTINGSATELM SERvIE Res. H (1977). The goal of that conference is to "draw up a detailed plan
for the orbit spectrum resource [which] provide[s] for the detailed assignment of the orbital
positions and frequency channels available, ensuring that the broadcasting-satellite service
requirements of the various administrations are met in an equitable manner satisfactory to
all the countries concerned." The plan should guarantee each state four channels. Above this
minimum, the special characteristics of the state (e.g., size, time zones, language differences)
will be taken into account. Id. at Res. HH.
39 See Rothblatt, Satellite Communication and Spectrum Allocation, 76 Am. J. INT'L L. 56 (1982)
(analysis of the'principle of maximum channel dispersion-which underlies most communications law and policy and could therefore explain the structural identity of open entry and
equitable access doctrines).
40 The principle of channel dispersion is achieved in practice by providing opportunities
for new initiatives in satellite communications. Id. at 58-65; see alsoPaper Presented by Stephen
Gorove, Hague Academy of International Law (Nov. 15, 1982) (discussing the utilization of
space in light of the concept of the common heritage of mankind).
41 WARC-79, supra note 7, at 74-75.
42 The author is indebted to Mr. Michael Jeruchim, Vice President at General Electric Co.,
for his comparative assessment of orbit/spectrum management options. See Public Docket File
No. 80-741 (F.C.C. 17714,1983) (prepared for the FCC's Space WARC Advisory Subcommit-
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43 Notice of Inquiry-Space WARC, supra note 2 (Comments of Comsat); ITU, CCIR Working
Paper 4/1, Doc. No. 4/286-E at ch. 6 (1981)(method 1) [hereinafter cited as CCIR Working
Paper].
44 See supra note 38.
45 See, e.g., Burgess & Schmidt, Satellite Constellations Using Multiple-Beam Satellites with OnboardSwitched IDMA, in SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS: FUTURE SYSTEMS 468 (D. Jarret ed. 1976); Yeh &
Reudnik, The Organization and Synchronization of a Switched Spot-Beam System, in DIGITAL SATELLITE
COMMUNICATIONS 191 (D. Staelin ed. 1978).
46 CCIR Working Paper, supra note 43 (method 2).
47 See supra notes 37 & 38.
48 CCIR Working Paper, supra note 43 (method 3).
49 All plans proposed to date specify a floor, or minimum allotment for each state. See,
e.g., supra note 38; see also Rutkowski, The 1979 World Administrative Radio Conference: The ITU in
a Changing World, 13 IN-r'L LAW. 289, 316, 324 (1979)(allotment results of 1974 Maritime
Conference and allotment results of 1977 Broadcasting Satellite Conference).
SO CCIR Working Paper, supra note 43 (method 4).
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52 Notice of Inquiry-Space WARC, supra note 2 (comments of Comsat).
53 See M. McDouGcA, H. LASSWELL & I. VLsic, LAw AND PUBLIC ORDER INSPACE (1963) (review
of other international space venture concepts).
54 See Rothblatt, InternationalCooperation in Regulating 12 GHz Band Geostationary Satellite Communications: Technology, Geopoliticsand the Common Heritageof Mankind,in PROCEEDINGS OF THE TwENrYTHIRD COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 189, 193 (1980).

55 See INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 30, at art. III(e),
23 U.S.T. 3820.
56 See J. PELToN, GLOBAL TALx 291-97 (1981) (lists and describes those smaller states which
are in the process of acceding to the INTELSAT system for domsat service, or which plan to
in the near future).
57 See Robinson, Regulating InternationalAirwaves: The 1979 WARC, 21 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 45
n.139 (1980); Rutkowski, Six Ad-Hoc Two: The Third World Speaks Its Mind, SATEU.rrs COMMUNICATIONS, Mar. 1980, at 17. See Jackson, The Orbit/Spectrum Resource: Market Allocation of International
Property, TELECOM. POL'Y, Sept. 1978, at 179; Levin, this volume.
58 Robinson, supra note 57, at 4; see also Rothblatt, ITU Regulation of Satellite Communications,
18 STAN. J. INTl' L. 1, 15 n.72 (1982)(quotes position of Indian delegate to WARC-1979).
59 See supra note 38.
60 See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
61 See supra notes 13-23 and accompanying text.
62 See Notice of Inquiry-Space WARC, supra note 2, at para. 15 ("The export potential for
American technology and equipment represents a significant U.S. interest that could be
affected at the Space WARC. It is in the U.S. interest to advocate geostationary-satetlite orbit
resource management mechanisms that allow innovative [U.S.] equipment and services to be
readily introduced into a growing domestic and international market.").
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66 SeeWARC-79, supra note 7, at Res. 3. The relevant portions of the resolution are
reprinted supra note 11.

